Security - DEFENCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Issue 42
Security through RISC
The UK Government published its first and long anticipated National Security Strategy (NSS) in March 2008, stimulating mixed reactions from various parts of the security and political communities. The Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) welcomed the strategy's publication from the outset1, and was not alone in doing so. The details within the NSS have generated mixed reactions and, in certain parts of the security industry, some disappointment. But, generally, the document has been welcomed as a useful foundation that offers all key stakeholders greater clarity around the government's strategic security priorities.
A new approach?
The publication of the NSS has been broadly recognised as a significant positive departure from previous arrangements, even if some of its content has suffered heavy criticism. The government states that the NSS 'is the first time the government has published a single, overarching strategy bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces involved in protecting our national security'2. This is indisputable, and signals a welcome shift to a comprehensive articulation of the increasing 'interconnectivity' between individual government departments' security responsibilities. The think tanks seem to agree. In response to possible criticism that the NSS is thin on detail, for example, the Director of the Homeland Security and Resilience department at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Dr Tobias Feakin, explains that if the NSS is "viewed as the genesis of pan-governmental, joined-up thinking on security, it becomes a more valuable piece of documentation"3.
In support of this shift to the first comprehensive articulation of existing cross-departmental Whitehall security activity, the NSS introduces a number of significant 'new' provisions. Amongst other items, the government stated that it would:
• Establish a 'National Security Forum', including 'people from central and local government, politics, academia, the private and third sectors, and other bodies, as well as people with relevant security experience';
• Publish a new 'National Risk Register', including 'information previously held privately within government';
• Establish a 'new Civil Protection network', which aims to replace 'the old idea of civil defence, building and strengthening local capacity to respond to a range of circumstances from floods to terrorism'.4
A role for industry?
Although there are limited references to the private sector and industry within the NSS, where they appear they are encouraging. For example, the government stated its intention 'to build on the coalition of public, private and third sectors already involved in counter-terrorism'5. This is important because, in the Prime Minister's own words, of all the identified security challenges in the NSS, 'the most serious and urgent remains the threat from international terrorism'6.
The government's recognition that 'increasingly, the changing nature of the threats and risks…demand broader partnerships'7 appears to reinforce the government's outward looking approach. This is developed further still through recognition that, when emergencies arise, the government is committed to 'working in partnership with all who have a role to play, across the public, private, community and third sectors'8.
However, the text makes limited references to specific technological advances that may be required from industry to support the NSS; the government simply states that a future priority is to enhance 'the protection against terrorism provided by new border technology'9 and that it is 'committed to working with international, public, and private sector partners to ensure that our government systems and critical national infrastructure are adequately protected against cyber-attack'10.
Strengths and perceived weaknesses
The government's stated desire to build on already existing relationships with the private sector to deliver the UK's Counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) is the NSS' strongest recognition of industry's important role in delivering UK security, and therefore the most significant element of the strategy from an industrial perspective. The RISC activity outlined below demonstrates how industry is already supporting the government in the counter-terrorism field.
However, a number of unanswered questions and observations have also arisen from the text. Although the NSS lists the 'national security objective' as 'protecting the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world'11, it does not specifically define 'security'. Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with defining the concept (and some argue that the document as a whole should be read as the government's definition of security), this lack of clarity inevitably leaves the observer, whether from industry or elsewhere, to question the government's security parameters. It is understood that these parameters are now broader than ever before, but in the absence of a definition, where exactly do they start and finish?
The government's decision to establish and invite contributors to participate in a 'National Security Forum' (NSF) has been welcomed by industry, and many companies and representative bodies are actively seeking to participate in this new body. But, to date, and even in view of the Prime Minister's written statement on 22nd July 2008, questions remain around the format of, and the process for informing, the NSF: When will it be established? Who specifically will contribute? How can industry become involved? Industry is working hard to understand the next steps; collectively, it feels it has a contribution to make in support of what could develop into a very important initiative.
There are further notable absences within the NSS. The government's Security and Counter Terrorism Science and Innovation Strategy12, launched in 2007, is not referred to within the document. Industry hopes that momentum will not be lost with respect to the development of this important, complementary strategy.
Similarly, to industry's surprise (and perhaps understandable regret), there is limited reference to budgetary information within the NSS, and none at all to specific anticipated security expenditure levels. Although the document's principal purpose is to articulate identified threats and outline the government's general security approach, industry continues to press for clarity around anticipated priorities and expenditure projections.
Finally, by way of a comparison, on 17th June 2008, the French Government also published a white paper on defence and national security13. With limited UK NSS industrial references in mind, initial reactions to the French white paper's provisions can be summarised as more positive. For, in the French example, a chapter heading is dedicated to 'industrial and technological priorities' for delivering national security. Clearly, a comparison based on the quantity of pages covering industry's contribution is no solid measure of a strategy's effectiveness. Nevertheless, industry's contribution is recognised to a greater extent in the French example. Future revisions of the UK NSS might consider whether any lessons learnt could be taken from the French model.
Therefore, from the SBAC's perspective, the most notable NSS omission is the absence of a high level sketch of the industrial interface mechanisms and broad capabilities available to the UK Government on security matters.
RISC
RISC was established in 2007 as the key link between industry and the UK Government on security (principally counter-terrorism) matters. RISC is an alliance of trade associations14, suppliers, academia, and think tanks designed to provide a single industry voice and channel of communication for government on strategic issues affecting national security and resilience.
RISC is currently in dialogue with the UK Home Office's Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) to establish processes for government, industry and the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) to develop further collaboration. Following NSS publication, in April 2008, OSCT invited RISC to form four pilot 'industry advisory groups' (IAGs) around themes pertinent to countering the severe terrorism threat posed. These are:
• Exploitation of CBRN research
• CNI protection
• ICT
• Stand-off protection from suicide bombers
Although the process of engagement is at an early stage as OSCT and RISC are both recognised as evolving bodies, OSCT's willingness to engage industry by forming RISC IAGs is encouraging. Industry has voted with its feet and responded well. It is now supporting OSCT's aims through strong participation in these IAGs.
How industry could help deliver the NSS through RISC
To build on the status quo and ensure that the appropriate sections of industry can support the government in delivering national security, a number of improvements could be made. Explicit recognition of RISC as the government's principal industrial interface of choice on UK-based security and resilience matters in future revisions of the NSS would be welcomed; RISC was not listed as a stakeholder within the NSS.
It is likely that industry input into the solutions required to mitigate the key risks identified in the government's 'National Risk Register' – scheduled for publication in July 2008 – will be required. It is obviously for the government to select any issue specific areas that might require input or advice from the security industry in forming its future operational requirements. But, notwithstanding industry's position as a supporting partner, the NSS' breadth suggests that future IAGs could include, but might not be limited to, the following areas: border security, transport security, maritime security and flood mitigation/response.
The development of the government's Security and Counter Terrorism Science and Innovation Strategy is considered to be crucial to delivering relevant industrial capabilities. Industry is keen to ensure that the strategy is fully integrated into all (current and future) relevant government activity. Industry would welcome clarity on the strategy's next steps, its recognition as a part of the NSS, and the development of a detailed plan and programme timeline to support its delivery.
Finally, to help ensure a genuine partnership for the future, the UK Government could recognise RISC as the appropriate industrial body to participate in the National Security Forum. It could also consider contributing financially to the RISC framework's development activity. UK industry currently finances the RISC model through its participating trade associations. In France, by contrast, there is a 'High Committee for Civil Defence'15, which co-ordinates some important activity of regional tiers of government, CNI, private providers and industry. 25% of the model's activity is funded by the state.
Concluding remarks
The NSS has been broadly welcomed by industry because it is the first significant attempt to consolidate the numerous security threats and risks that the UK faces, and because it outlines the departmental roles and responsibilities designed to address them in a coherent manner. Industry has also welcomed the government's commitment to continue to work with, and build upon, existing relationships with the private sector on counter-terrorism matters.
Both government and industry should recognise and articulate industry's essential role in delivering UK security to a greater extent. Reference to RISC in future NSS revisions would be a welcome first step. The mechanisms and plans that support industrial input into the NSS could also be strengthened; this article suggested some possible options and improvements to the RISC framework to that end. In addition, industry would welcome greater direction and clarity on possible future technology, system and equipment requirements emerging from the strategy. The UK-based security and resilience elements of the NSS might also benefit from an underlying supporting plan that builds upon existing activity and that helps to deliver the NSS. RISC is already making good progress, and is currently the most appropriate industrial interface for supporting the government in the delivery of UK national security and resilience.
1 See SBAC News Release 'Publication of National Security Strategy welcomed by industry', available at: https://www.sbac.co.uk/community/dms/docdetails.asp?txtDocPK=4130&m=1&hidedetails=1
2 See 'The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security_strategy.aspx p.4
3 Dr Tobias Feakin 'The National Security Strategy – The Golden Thread of Interconnectivity' available online at: http://www.rusi.org/research/hsr/intro/commentary/ref:C47E1550676341/
4 See Cabinet Office News Release 'Government Publishes First National Security Strategy', available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2008/080319_nss.aspx
5 'The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' p.8
6 The Prime Minister's National Security Strategy Statement available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page15102.asp
7 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom p.8
8 Ibid. p.41
9 Ibid. p.28
10 Ibid. p.44
11 Ibid. p.5
12 Available at: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/science-innovation-strategy1
13 More details available at: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/New-French-White-Paper-on-defence.html
14 Trade Associations representing the broader RISC community include: Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers (APPSS), British Security Industry Association (BSIA), Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA), Intellect, NBC UK, Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC)
15 More details available at: http://www.hcfdc.org/index.php
This article first appeared in DMJ 42