
11 June 2012
If the UN will not endorse military intervention in Syria, then the alternative is to do it in a way that is ostensibly not military intervention as such.
Following the example of Libya, the US and the UK could formally recognise the resistance movement in Syria as the legitimate government, or perhaps as an element of the legitimate government, and then take action to protect it and to promote a peaceful political transition from a regime which puts Russia's interests above the lives of the Syrian people, to one which does the opposite of that. "Peaceful" in this context is of course relative.
The Russians never seem to have much difficulty finding a suitable premise when they decide to take military action, whether it's in Afghanistan, Georgia or Chechnya.
In a moral sense, I would question whether the west can continue to tolerate the kind of scenes we're seeing in Syria now. I also don't think it's good for international relations generally for the UN to be seen to be discredited by events in this way.
J. Southworth - University of Hull
11 June 2012
The Syrians give Russia its only Mediterranean port which they are not going to risk with 'regime change'.
The Russians will support Assad indefinitely. The UN has always been susceptible to national self interest of its members in the UN SC which has always limited its value.
Graham - High Wycombe
13 June 2012
The problem faced by UN is whether the Free Syrian Army are native rebels trying to overthrow an oppressive govt, or radical muslim insurgents masquerading as freedom fighters. Personally, I am not too sure what they are.
Last thing UN wants to do is get rid of a legit (if very nasty) regime for one that will require military action to restore stability to the region because they turn out to be something other than 'rebels'.
One final aspect to note, is Syria borders Israel and the Russians will not want any US-backed expansion of Israel into Syria on the pre-text of regional stabilisation. Any military invention has to be Arab-led and Arab-manned.
AW Employee - Yeovil
29 June 2012
It's perhaps worth recalling how in 1991 and 2003, US intelligence went to great lengths to contact key figures in the Iraqi regime and military with a view to persuading them to come over, or failing that, at least dissuade them from using chemical weapons against coalition forces. Under the right conditions, and with the right technology, it's possible to take over the enemy's (or the potential enemy's) communications net and use it for your own purposes, while at the same time preventing their messages and orders from getting through where necessary.
It seems likely that any US or NATO intervention in Syria would have as a primary objective, the avoidance of armed conflict with Syrian forces where possible. The objective would be a political transition rather than the forcible overthrow of the present regime, or the destruction of the Syrian armed forces. I don't think anyone expects or wants to see a repetition on a larger scale of what happened in Libya. The memory of the Libyan intervention is actually a problem for the US and NATO in the present situation.
J. Southworth - University of Hull
19 July 2012
I think we have to ask why the Russian Government are supporting the Assad regime to the extent that they are, what their strategic objectives are in doing that, how this fits in with their other strategic goals.
One thing they would definitely like to do is to engineer a split within NATO, between the European NATO nations and the US. That would obviously have the effect of enhancing their influence in Eastern Europe. And it may be that they regard the situation in the Middle East as the potential means of doing that. If so, that would help to explain quite a lot; the well organised and clearly well financed political agitation against Israel by organisations like the Stop The War Coalition and the Socialist Worker Party in the UK, for example. Such agitation also helps to divert publicity from the Russian government's actions in Chechnya, Dagestan and other places.
The main strategic role of Syria in the recent past has been that of a provider of support to Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, and a "cut-out" through which they can receive military supplies from Russia, Iran and other countries. Apparently the Russian government still considers this role to be important, perhaps now even more so than in the 1970s when they used Syria to support the PLO and PFLP.
It may be that the Russian government are hoping that a NATO intervention in Syria will cause a split in NATO. In that case, it might seem possible that the atrocities being committed now by the Assad regime, with the encouragement of the Russians, are themselves intended as a means of provoking such an intervention. But it is more likely in my view that the situation is getting out of control and that the regime is resorting to desperate measures in an attempt to impose order.
Ultimately, Russia has little to gain from a military confrontation with NATO in the Mediterranean, for obvious geographic reasons. There are only three exits, the Bosphorus, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Gibraltar, all of which can be sealed off quite easily. So while the Russians could deploy a significant naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean, it might end up being trapped there if the situation escalated as a result of that move.
J. Southworth - University of Hull