Reassessing the G4S Olympic security affair

03 October 2012

Security analyst Hugo Rosemont argues that the Home Office was not a marginal player in the Olympic security 'fiasco'which saw thousands of troops deployed at short notice and one private security firm taking the majority of the blame

The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) has concluded that the blame for the failure to deliver the contract to supply sufficient numbers of venue security staff for the London 2012 Olympic Games lies 'firmly and solely' with private security company G4S. Following 11 July, when the company informed the authorities that it would be unable to supply all of the 10,400 officers that it was contracted for, G4S was widely criticised for the 'fiasco' and became the media's summer 'whipping boy'. However, whilst G4S cannot be excused for its major failings in relation to the contract, the suggestion that it was solely to blame for the whole affair must be questioned. The Home Office committed a substantial amount of taxpayers' money to the G4S contract and it cannot completely abdicate its responsibility.

It should be stated up front that the armed forces and the emergency services performed magnificently during London 2012. The UK delivered 'safe and secure' Games mainly because of them and the UK's Intelligence Agencies. A huge debt of gratitude is owed to everyone who played a role in resolving the G4S shortfall. However, it is not wishing to downplay the military's contributions to say that they were not completely surprising.

London's original 2004 Olympic bid document envisaged that the Ministry of Defence would support the games security operation and the authorities frequently argued that contingencies were in place. Whilst such a vast military operation for the Olympics had not originally been anticipated, nor despite its subsequent success was it desirable, this option was always on the table.

So why should anyone now doubt that G4S was solely to blame for the whole affair? Firstly, after G4S was initially contracted to provide 2,000 new personnel, amongst other services, the HASC report shows that it was only in December 2011 when it signed a 'variation of the contract' to increase the requirement of new staff on the company to 10,400 officers. Whilst the increase was being discussed with G4S from August 2011 and the company later freely agreed to the alteration - with devastating consequences, it transpired - should a lesson (not offered in the HASC report) be that it would have been better to finalise the requirement much earlier on? The circumstances leading up to December 2011 are significant because the 'delays in establishing an accurate picture of the number of staff who would be required' were not the responsibility of G4S. At a minimum, those who were responsible for venue security for the Games must have known the risks associated with a plan to recruit such a large number of additional, appropriately trained security staff at such a late stage. Whilst G4S would have been handsomely rewarded for delivering the uplift - and provided numerous assurances that it could achieve it - from this perspective it could be seen less as a villain than as a supplier seeking to fulfil a unique, risky but nationally-important contract.

Although the HASC report states that 'nobody has suggested that the delays in producing venue security plans were in any way responsible for the failure of G4S', the committee does not seem to have contemplated that in signing the alteration at such a late stage the company might have been trying to act in good faith as part of a last minute effort to meet unforeseen demand.

Secondly, it was the government, not G4S, who was ultimately accountable for the Games' security. It had provided legal 'guarantees' to the International Olympic Committee to this effect and, according to the Olympic security strategy, the Home Secretary was 'accountable for the delivery of a Safety and Security Strategy, delivery plans and the Safety and Security Programme.' That G4S is now being held solely responsible for the admittedly serious contract failure should be seen in the context of the Home Secretary's own overall accountability for London 2012 security, and the fact that it was her department that committed public money to cover the costs of a contract that at one stage was worth up to £284m. With its focus on the failure of the contract itself, and the final events leading up to it, the HASC report does not give sufficient weight to a central aspect of the Games' security governance framework and the funding arrangements for them.

There is another relevant issue - the Home Office's on-going hesitation to engage industry on security issues in a more favourable manner. The coalition government's February 2012 White Paper addressing this issue, 'National Security Through Technology', was applauded for committing to 'evaluate the potential benefits' of appointing a 'Senior Responsible Owner' to be tasked with this responsibility. Reassuringly, such an appointment is still expected later this year. Until then, however, it will remain unclear how the government intends to work with the security industry on strategic issues.

Why is this problematical? Firstly, until the appointment is made the security industry's contributions to national security and resilience will continue to draw less Home Office attention than other sectors receive from their own natural 'host' departments. Provided effective oversight and scrutiny, the new appointee would allow the department to engage with the private sector more effectively and could put a halt to the growing list of failed UK security procurements. Had the appointment been made in early 2011, when it was recommended, the Olympic security difficulties might have been overcome because the Home Office would have possessed a stronger sense of ownership for commercial matters.

Secondly, if 'every department is an economic department', as the Prime Minster argues, the Home Office should develop a strategy for growth and consider whether the ease with which it has criticised a leading global security company with a substantial UK footprint has been helpful. It could assist UK-based companies improve their share of the growing global security market to a greater extent and seek to work more closely with European partners as the EU develops an industrial policy for the security sector. It also 'owns' the government's immigration policy which has received criticism from an economic perspective.

It has been concluded that G4S was solely to blame for the Olympic security contract affair. Whilst senior executives have now resigned over the failure and the company must continue to accept full responsibility for its major role in the regrettable saga, the Home Office was not a marginal player in the 'fiasco' and the HASC should not have allowed the impression to emerge that it was. G4S may have 'only' provided 7,800 security officers at peak times during the Olympics, after a late variation to its original contract, but the episode also points towards some wider issues. Questions are on-going around accountability at the Home Office, and how the department will engage with industry and contribute to the UK's economic agenda.

Hugo Rosemont is a security analyst and doctoral student at King's College, London. This article is longer version of a speech he delivered to the Private Military and Security Research Conference at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 28 September 2012.