That Liberal Democrat motion in full

Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Here's the full text of Liberal Democrat shadow foreign secretary Edward Davey's speech in support of the party conference motion on Afghanistan:

"Conference, there is much in this motion I agree with. First, it pays tribute to our armed forces and their families. Their courage and professionalism is something that our country should be deeply proud of. Second, it recognises time is running out for the mission in Afghanistan.

Yet it rightly does NOT call for an immediate withdrawal – as that would be disastrous for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Third, the motion welcomes Obama's emerging changes in strategy, especially the White House's White paper on US Afghanistan policy last March that pointed to talks with the Taliban.

Fourth, it has sensible proposals – from the regional peace agreement to our government being far more transparent about progress on Britain's objectives in Afghanistan.

So Conference please back this.

My main criticism is what it omits. I said on Sunday it was "time to take tea with the Taliban". As a political surge based on reconciliation with those Taliban and other insurgents who are reconcilable. And I caused consternation in some quarters for this. One Conservative blogger called the notion an "insult to those who serve in our armed forces" – as if our armed forces had never been involved in the shades of grey of a counter-insurgency campaign, like Northern Ireland.

No Conference. The real insult to our armed forces is NOT talking about a more realistic strategy in Afghanistan. Anyone who has studied the last 30 years of war in Afghanistan will know battles tend to be decided by defections, not fighting. That the winner will be the one who gets parts of the opposing side to realign. And if you want to persuade local tribal leaders to defect you have to talk. Normally in Afghanistan over tea.

During the civil war that followed the Soviet's withdrawal, the Uzbek commander, General Dostum was first the friend of the Tajik commander, Massoud – and then his enemy. The Hazara leader, Mazari, first fought against the Pashtun commander Hekmatyar, and then fought with him. The reason the Taliban triumphed in 1998 was not because they had the largest core number of fighters. They didn't. It was because they proved most effective at winning over defectors.

So is it possible to get Taliban commanders to defect?

Well, YES. In December 2004, a senior Taliban commander, Abdul Wahid, jumped ship to back President Karzai. Other Taliban commanders have done so over the years. Part of the problem has been the unwillingness of President Karzai to allow these defectors to integrate back.

When Wakil Mutawakil, the former Taliban foreign minister, wanted to defect in 2002, he was arrested and detained. Other senior Taliban leaders who defected weren't exploited for further reconciliation, but were shipped off to Guantanamo Bay.

Rather than encouraging defectors, Karzai and the Americans have often done the reverse. The flagship reconciliation process to date was the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, launched in 2005. Great intentions – but no budget.

In Kandahar province – a key Taliban base – this project had a monthly budget of $600. Pathetic. Feeble. And strange because the US used the strategy I'm advocating in Iraq. They bought off much of the Sunni militia, by putting them on the government's books.

In Afghanistan, experts calculate that for $30m a month – far far less than the monthly cost of fighting – you could put 250,000 insurgents into the Afghan army. Now I'm not pretending that's easy. To be effective, it will need each local case to be considered individually, to take account of particular tribal links, traditions and local interests.

And I'm convinced such a process will still require a strong NATO military force. Indeed, our armed forces must be there as part of the incentive mechanism that persuades thousands of insurgents to switch sides.

But a strategy of grassroots diplomacy. Reconciliation diplomacy. Tea-drinking diplomacy. That is a strategy worth trying. Not because our troops aren't capable of fighting back – they are. No. It's a strategy worth trying because history tells us that's what works in Afghanistan."

Here's and full text of the motion passed by the Lib Dem conference:

Conference expresses:
I. Extreme concern and deep sorrow over the rise in the number of British soldiers killed and wounded in Afghanistan, mixed with admiration and gratitude to Britain's armed forces for their sacrifices and bravery; remembering too the military and civilian personnel and their families from other allied countries who have lost their lives.
II. Our sympathies to the families of those civilians killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and deep disquiet over increasing civilian deaths caused by aerial attacks, which can further consolidate support for insurgent forces within Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Conference notes:
i) The shifting military and political objectives of the Western forces in Afghanistan since 2001.
ii) The extreme centralisation of, and corruption within, the Afghan government – who, notwithstanding, have full control over only a minority of the territory of the country.
iii) That more than half Afghan GDP is now related to the illegal narcotics business, the result of which is that UK streets are flooded with cheap heroin, causing deaths which are set to exceed 1000 this year.
iv) A decline in living conditions since 2001 and a recent deterioration in the legal position of women.
v) The 'conflict-facilitating lawlessness' across the border in the Pakistani tribal areas, where the Pakistani constitution does not fully apply.
vi) That public confidence in the recent elections was seriously undermined by widespread fraud.

Conference believes:
A. The primary and urgent security aim now should be to stop the killing on all sides, and put an end to the 30 years of continuous war which have created poverty, chaos and militancy.
B. That the path to a positive end to the conflict lies in the orchestration of a regional peace agreement which takes into account the security and economic concerns of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India and other countries involved or affected, under a UN framework.
C. Progress towards peace should not depend on 'gaining the upper hand militarily' – since such a condition is hard to define, it will delay a peace settlement, and it effectively puts the potential for political progress in the hands of military forces.

Conference welcomes the decision by the United States under President Obama to adopt a new approach, the assessment by the new Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, that a new 'Western' strategy is needed, and the call for a regional peace agreement from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Conference therefore calls for:
1. An end to the killing and to 30 years of war in Afghanistan, and the start of a regional peace process, not contingent on 'Western' forces 'having the upper hand militarily' – and the pursuit of a ceasefire, leading to a political and constitutional settlement within Afghanistan.
2. The UK government to press the US government to end its 'military first' approach, and shift priority to the economic, political and social development of Afghanistan.
3. The necessary inclusion in the work towards a peace process of three key elements:
a) A properly financed decentralised government.
b) Support for the Pakistani government's desire to extend its constitution into tribal areas.
c) Steps to develop economic cooperation and trade in the region with all countries neighbouring Afghanistan.

4. In particular, the UK government to:
a) Focus on concluding the Afghanistan mission and to report to Parliament in detail on progress towards a withdrawal.
b) Present to Parliament on its return a series of public 'mission tests' that set out progress towards key security and governance goals, and progress with allies in steps to peace, against which ministers can be held to account.